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I. INTRODUCTION

This dispute between Burns Holdings, LLC (jointly with its affiliate Burns Concrete, Inc.,
"Burns") and Teton County, Idaho ("Teton County") arises out of the terms of the Developer's
Agreement for Burns Holdings, LLC (the "Agreement") attached as Exhibit i to both Burns'

Complain/ and the Appellants' Brief filed in this appeal and as Exhibit B to the Respondent's
Brief filed in this appeal.
Teton County's manifestly unfair treatment of Burns under the Agreement is illustrated
by the following undisputed facts.
•

Before Burns purchased the real property at issue in this lawsuit, both Teton
County and the City of Driggs designated the property as the specific site where
burns should construct a concrete batch plant (the "Permanent Facility").

Complaint ,i 23 (R, p. 7).
•

Following execution of the Agreement, Burns expended many hundreds of
thousands of dollars constructing and implementing the commitments imposed
under the Agreement, including without limitation (a) erecting and operating a
temporary concrete batch plant (the "Temporary Facility") required under
Paragraph 2.b(v) of the Agreement, which required Burns to incur substantial
expense for site demolition, remediating the site for prior waste disposal, clearing
and grubbing the site, extending utilities to the site, and transporting to and
erecting on the site the Temporary Facility; (b) constructing the road and highway

1

Verified Complaint for: (i) Declaratory Judgment, (ii) Breach of Contract and
Rescission, (iii) Unjust Enrichment, filed May 21, 2013 ("Complaint") [R, pp. 1-24].
-121813.001\4823-8118-5839 v2

improvements required under Paragraph 2.d(iv) of the Agreement, which required
Bums to incur substantial expense for barrier fencing with concrete foundations,
new tum lanes, landscaping, and performance bonds; and (c) applying for and
taking all actions necessary to obtain the CUP and zoning variance required to
construct the Permanent Facility. Complaint 1 17 [R, p. 6].
•

Bums undertook every act reasonably possible to obtain the CUP and zoning
variance required by Teton County for Bums to construct the Permanent Facility,
both of which Teton County refused to issue. Complaint 120 [R, p. 6].

•

Bums cannot now construct the Permanent Facility without an amendment to the
ordinances of Teton County. Complaint 121 [R, p. 7].

•

Bums has operated the Temporary Facility in accordance with the tenns of the
Agreement; however, Bums has not ever been able to construct the Permanent
Facility by reason of action and inaction by Teton County over which Bums has
no control. Complaint 125 [R, p. 7].

•

Nevertheless, Teton County seeks to rezone Bums' property to preclude its use as
a concrete batch plant and force Bums to remove the Temporary Facility from the
property, with Teton County maintaining the "free" public road improvements
Bums was contractually obligated to construct under the Agreement and without
reimbursing Bums for any of the several hundred thousand dollars in out-ofpocket costs Bums was contractually obligated to incur.

-221813.001\4823-8118-5839 v2

II. RESPONSE TO UNSUPPORTED AND DISPUTED FACTUAL ASSERTIONS
Brief or
At no point during the litigation of this case, including in either Appellants'
ambiguous in any
Respondent's Brief, has Burns or Teton County asserted that the Agreement is
nt, filed
See Memor andum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgme

respect.

ous.") [R, p. 125].
December 19, 2014, at 8 ("Both parties agree that the Agreement is not ambigu
ing its terms
Because the Agreement is not ambiguous, the following rule for constru
applies:
Where a legal instrument is found to be unambiguous the legal
effect must be decided by the district court as a matter of law; it is
only when the instrument is found to be ambiguous that evidence
as to the meaning of that instrument may be submitted to the finder
of fact.

See also Potlatch
Knipe Land Co. v. Roberfson, 151 Idaho 449, 455, 259 P 3d 595, 601 (2011).
1277, 1280 (2010)
Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d
ordinary and proper
('"In the absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain,
ent."' (Citation
sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrum
interpretation of the
omitted.)). In addition to the application of the parol-evidence rule to the
in the appeal to be
Agreement, Idaho precedent requires that all factual matters considered
Idaho 1014, 1017,
included in the record on appeal. Feld v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass 'n, 126
record will not be
895 P.2d 1207, 1210 (1995) ("Questions or matters not presented in the
d these two legal
considered by this Court on appeal."). Teton County has repeatedly violate
principles in Respondent's Brief
terms of the
Thus, in an effort to discredit Burns and thereby avoid the unambiguous
of transcripts for
Agreement, Teton County has quoted from, characterized, and attached copies
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hearings held by the Teton County Board of Commissioners on February 26, 2007, which was
six months before the Agreement was executed, and on November 15, 2007, which was more
than two months after the Agreement was executed. See Respondent's Brief 2-3, 5-6, 8-9 and
Exs. A & C. Neither of these transcripts (nor any of the quoted statements) are inciuded in the
record on appeal. Nor does Teton County provide any argument or authority establishing why
consideration of the statements contained in these transcripts is not barred by the parol-evidence
rule. Moreover, a fair reading of the February 26 transcript establishes that the Teton County
Commissioners, or at least their chairman, understood "issues like building height and so on and
so forth are going to be hammered out in this development agreement." Respondent's Brie/Ex.
A, p. 17, LL. 7-9. (See also id. at p. 25, LL. 7-11, where Kirk Burns qualified his response to
Chairman Young's question, "what square footage and what height?" by stating: "We don't
have that completely worked out.") Finally, the comments at the February 26 hearing attributed
to Kirk Burns on page 2 of Respondent's Brief are all attributed in the transcript itself to an
unidentified "Voice." Id. at pp. 31-32. And for all the foregoing reasons, those portions of
Respondent's Brief identified in this paragraph should be wholly disregarded by the Court in

deciding this appeal.
But in addition to violating the parol-evidence rule and relying on factual matters not in
the record on appeal, Teton County has also repeatedly asserted "facts" for which there is no
possible support and misstated the express terms of the unambiguous Agreement, including in
the following instances:
1.

Teton County asserts that "the Agreement also allowed Burns to construct and

operate a temporary facility .... " Respondent's Brie/I (emphasis added). But Paragraph 2.b(v)

-421813.00l\4823-8118-5839 v2

concrete
of the Agreement expressly provides that Bums "shall erect and operate a temporary
batch plant on site .... " (Emphasis added.)
2.

Teton County asserts that "Bums was required to bring their private road up to

is there
public works standards." Respondent's Brief l (emphasis added). However, not only
2.c and
nothing in the record suggesting that Bums even has a private road, but Paragraphs
to
2.d(iv) of the Agreement expressly provide that the road improvements Bums was required
and not
construct were to State Highway 33 and Casper Lane, which are both public roads
89].
private ones. See also Affidavit of Kirk Burns, filed November 5, 2014, at ,r,r 3-4 [R, p.
3.

Teton County asserts that "Burns attached a sketch of their desired building as

support
Exhibit "C" to the Agreement." Respondent's Brief3 (emphasis added). But there is no
m the record or in fact for this assertion, which Burns denies.
4.

Teton County asserts: "There is nothing in the body of the Agreement that states

s Exhibit
that the height of the building shall be 75 feet. . . . Paragraph 2(b )(iii) simply identifie
'"
"C" as containing 'plans for construction of Developer's intended permanent facility.
actually
Respondent's Brief 8 (emphasis in original). Yet Paragraph 2. b(iii) of the Agreement

and by
provides: "Attached as Exhibit "B"-Si te Plan, and Exhibit "C"-Bu ilding Elevations,
nt
this reference incorporated herein are plans for construction of Develop er's intended permane
clearly
facility ("Permanent Facility")." (Emphasis added.) And Exhibit "C" to the Agreement
depicts the Permanent Facility as being 75' high.
5.

Teton County asserts that "Bums could build something that complies with

record or
current zoning, yet they refuse." Respondent's Briefl 1. But there is no support in the
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in fact for this assertion, and Bums disputes that it 1s economically feasible to limit the
Permanent Facility to only 45' in height.
6.

Teton County asserts that "Bums hoped that by inserting an exhibit into the zone

change agreement that depicted their desired facility, that the Board would be bound to approve
their application to build the 75-foot tall facility." Respondent's Brief 12 (emphasis added). But
there is no support in the record or in fact for this assertion either, which Bums denies.
7.

Teton County asserts that "Burns could have built a concrete batch plant that

complied with zoning restrictions." Respondent's Brie/20. But again there is no support in the
record or in fact for this assertion, and Burns disputes that it is economically feasible to build any
concrete batch plant of only 45' in height.
8.

Teton County asserts: "Paragmph 2(b)(iii) of the Agreement contains the only

reference to Exhibit "C," calling it 'plans for construction of Develope r's intended permanent
facility.' The use of the word "intended" hardly supports a mandate that this exact building must
be constructed." Respondent's Brie/20-2 1. Yet Paragraph 2.b(iii) and Exhibits "B" and "C" of
the Agreement first specify the site plan and building elevations for the Permanent Facility, and
Paragraph 2.b(iv) then provides: "Immediately upon execution of this Agreement, Developer

shall order and commence construction of the Permanent Facility." (Emphasis added.)
9.

Teton County asserts that "Burns has explored no avenue for building other than

the 75 foot tall plant." Respondent's Brie/21. But there is also no support in the record or in
fact for this assertion, which Burns denies.
10.

Teton County asserts that "[t]he purpose of the Agreement is to rezone the

property to M-1, not to waive the height restriction in the M-1 zone." Respondent's Brief 22.

-621813.00l\4823-8118-5839 v2

the second recital in the Agreement specifically states that "the Developer has requested the
zone change for the purpose of developing a concrete batch plant facility ... ," and the third
recital establishes that Teton County entered into the Agreement ''for the purpose of allowing, by
agreement, a specific development to proceed in a specific area and for a specific purpose or
use .... " (Emphasis added.)
11.

Teton County asserts that "the only position that the Board took on the height of

the structure occurred at a public hearing where a conditional use permit was denied ... and at a
public hearing where a variance was denied .... " Respondent's Brief23. Yet Teton County
admits in its Answer that it entered into the Agreement and caused the Agreement to be recorded
in the office of the Teton County Clerk, Answer ,i 16 [R, p. 27], and Exhibit "C" of the
Agreement expressly depicts the Permanent Facility as being 75' high. See also the signature
page of the Agreement, which is impressed with the official seal of Teton County.
12.

Teton County asserts that "[t]he fact that Burns improved its own property does

not create an advantage for the County .... " Respondent's Brief 24 (emphasis added). Yet as
pointed out in paragraph 2 above, the road improvements Bums was required to construct were
to State Highway 33 and Casper Lane, which are both public roads-an d if these public
improvements did not advantage Teton County, why on earth did it require Bums to construct
them?
13.

Teton County asserts "that Bums agreed to and benefitte dfrom the improvements

they made." Responde nt's Brief 25 (emphasis added). But again there is no support in the
record or in fact for this assertion, which Bums disputes.
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14.

Teton County similarly asserts that "the temporary facility, which utilizes both the

(emphasis
highway and road, has continued operating to Burns' benefit." Respondent's Brie/26
has ever
added). But there is also no support in the record or in fact for the assertion that Bums
operated the Temporary Faciiity at a profit, and Burns most vehemently denies that it has.
15.

Teton County asserts that "[t]he temporary plant exceeds the height limit allowed

26. But
in its zone .... [and] has violated the law for over eight years .... " Respondent's Brief
.
once again there is no support in the record or in fact for these assertions, which Bums disputes
16.

Teton County also asserts "[i]t is undisputed that the Temporary Facility is 70 feet

But there
tall .... [and] violates the height regulation in the M-1 zone." Respondent's Brie/27 .
is also no support in the record or in fact for these assertions, which Burns disputes.
Finally, in contrast to the f01egoing numerous misstatements by Teton County, ,;vhich
Teton
form the essence of its equitable arguments, Burns requests this Court to take notice that

nts '
County has not disputed a single asserted fact or term of the Agreement contained in Appella
Brief
III. REBUTTAL OF RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT
Teton County' s legal arguments are founded on two general contentions set forth in the
introduction to its argument. The first of these contentions is as follows:
Yet Burns' entire argument is [i] based on the idea that the
Agreement somehow allows them to build a 75-foot tall building,
and [ii] that the County is preventing them, or making it impossible
for them to do so.

Respondent's Brie/7-8 .
Teton County, however, misstates the first leg of its foregoing compound contention (i.e.,
. Rather,
that Burns believes the Agreement allows Burns to build the 75' Permanent Facility)
-821813.001\4823-8118-5839 v2

and
Burns' argument is that the Agreement requires Burns to build the 75' Permanent Facility
time for
that the very same paragraph imposing this construction obligation also extends the
12.b(iv).
Burns to do so when delayed by "action beyond Developer's control." Agreement
has
Moreover, the second ieg of Teton County' s compound contention (i.e., that Teton County
well as
prevented Burns from constructing the Permanent Facility) is both indispu table-as
its
undisputed by Teton County -and the very reason that the time for Burns to satisfy
construction obligation has been extended under Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Agreement.
as
The second general contention on which Teton County' s legal argument is founds is
follows:
More importantly, the Board of County Commissioners could not
have contracted for a 30-foot deviation from the height ordinance.
Paragrnph I2(f) of the Agreement contains a clause that "If any
term of this agreement is declared invalid, illegal or unenforceable,
the remainder of this agreement shall remain operative and
binding." A contract provision that requires a party to violate the
law by building a structure 30 feet in excess of what the zoning
ordinance allows, is invalid, illegal and unenforceable.

Respondent's Brief 8.
But in making the foregoing argument Teton County ignores the following undisputed
facts and interrelated contractual provisions:
•

The parties at all times concurred that Burns was required to obtain Teton
County' s approval for constructing the Permanent Facility, and, as Teton County
points out, over two months before the Agreement was executed "Burns applied
for a conditional use permit (CUP) on June 13, 2007." Respondent's Brie/3.

•

Paragraph 10 of the Agreement requires Bums to comply with all "county and
local laws, rules and regulations, which appertain to the subject property."
-9-
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•

Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Agreement doesn't only require Bums to construct the
Permanent Facility within 18 months, but it also extends the time for Burns to do
so when delayed by "action beyond Developer's control."

•

Paragraph 2.b(v) of the Agreement doesn't only require Bums to construct "a
temporary concrete batch plant on site ... ," but it also allows Bums to operate
the Temporary Facility until the Permanent Facility can be constructed.

Thus, not only did the Agreement require Burns to comply with all of Teton County's zoning
ordinances, but the Agreement provided for Burns' use of its property as contemplated by the
parties (i.e., as a concrete batch plant) from the date the Agreement was executed though today.
Or stated otherwise, and contrary to Teton County's quoted argument, there is no "contract
prov1s1on that requires [Burns] to violate the law by building a structwe 30 feet in excess of what
2
the zoning ordinance allows ... " Rather, what the Agreement requires is for Burns to continue

to operate the Temporary Facility as it has been doing until Burns can construct the Permanent
Facility. See Agreement 1 5 ("if the property ... is not used as approved, or if the approved use
ends or is abandoned, the Board of County Commissioners may ... order that the property will
revert to the [prior] zoning designation zone .... ").

2

In the unlikely event the Agreement was held to be void, Bums pleaded an alternative
claim (Count III) against Teton County for unjust enrichment and the recovery of restitution
damages. Complaint 139 [R, p. 10].
-1021813.001\4823-8118-5839 v2

A.

The Force Majeure Clause Suspends Burns' Obligation to Construct the
Permanent Facility.
3

Bums' position with respect to the application of the Force Majeure Clause is not that
Teton County breached the Agreement or otherwise acted wrongfully when it denied Bums the
zoning approvals and building permit required for construction of the Permanent Facility, but
rather that Teton County's actions in denying the required zoning approvals and building permit
requested by Bums were "actions beyond the Developer's control." And nowhere does Teton
County contend that its actions in denying the requested approvals and permits were within
Bums' control or that Bums might have constructed the Permanent Facility without first
obtaining the requested approvals and permits.

Thus, Teton County must argue that the

unambiguous phrase "action beyond Developer's control" should be construed so as to exclude
Teton County's actions in denying Bums the zoning approvals and building permit required for
construction of the Permanent Facility.
In arguing that the wording of the Force Majeure Clause should not be construed to mean
what it says, Teton County does not distinguish any of the following Idaho legal principles and
precedents argued by Burns in Appellants' Brief
•

'"In the absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain,
ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain

3

Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Agreement provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The installation of the Permanent Facility shall be completed within eighteen (18)
months of execution of this Agreement by the County, subject to delays resulting
from weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or any other
act of force maj eure or action beyond Developer's control.
(Underscoring added.) (The foregoing contractual provision is hereinafter referred to as the
"Force Majeure Clause.")
-1121813.00l\4823-8118-5839 v2

wording of the instrument."' Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, supra, 151 Idaho at
454, 259 P.3d at 600 (quoting Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch School Dist. No.

285, supra, 148 Idaho at 633,226 P.3d at 1280).
•

"We must construe this contract so as to give effect to every part of it, if
possible." Ace Realty, Inc. v. Anderson, l 06 Idaho 742, 749-50, 682 P.2d 1289,
1296-97 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Wright v. Village of Wilder, 63 Idaho 122, 117
P.2d 1002 (1941). Accord Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway Dist., 134 Idaho
731, 735, 9 P.3d 534, 538 (2000); Twin Lakes Vill. Prop. Ass 'n, Inc. v. Crowley,
124 Idaho 132, 137, 857 P.2d 611, 616 (1993); George v. Univ. of Idaho, 121
Idaho 30, 36, 822 P.2d 549, 555 (Ct. App. 1991).

•

"This Court has no 'rnving powe1 to rcvvrite contracts to make them more
equitable.' Thus, when weighing various interpretations of contracts, we consider
the language of the agreement as 'the best indication of [the parties'] intent."'

City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 437, 299 P.3d 232, 244 (2013)
(internal and concluding citations omitted).
s
Accordingly, in its attempt to avoid the result dictated by the foregoing legal principle
that
and precedents and the plain meaning of the Force Majeure Clause, Teton County argues
to is the
"[t]he act of force majeure or action beyond the Develop er's control that Burns points
d .... "
45-foot height regulation that was in place at the time the property was purchase
is that
Respondent's Brief l 0. But this plainly misstates Bums' position, which, as stated above,
were
Teton County' s actions in denying the requested zoning approvals and building permit
"actions beyond the Develop er's Control."

-1221813.00J\4823-8118-5839 v2

ed by Bums (i.e.,
Teton County next argues facts not supported by the record and disput
, yet they refuse.") for the
"Bum s could build something that complies with current zoning
is not a force majeure."
conclusion: "Refusal to build a structure that complies with the law
right to construct anything
Respondent's Brief ii. But nothing in the Agreement gives Burns the
ts a finding that it would
other than the 75' Permanent Facility, and nothing in the record suppor
plant of less than 75' in
be economically feasible for Burns to construct a concrete batch
heigh t-let alone one complying with the existing 45' height limitation.
y would approve the
Teton County then argues that, because Bums assumed Teton Count
ed the risk of obtaining a
required approvals and permits that were requested, "Bum s assum
Bums denies this is so. But
permit to exceed the height regulation .... " Respondent's Brief 11.
ctual rights (i) to extend
even if it were for some reason, Bums also obtained the related contra
d by "actions beyond the
the deadline for constructing the Permanent Facility if delaye
until the Permanent Facility
Developer's Control[,]" and (ii) to operate the Temporary Facility
can be constructed.

t the
Moreover, none of the authorities cited by Teton County suppor

re taken by one contracting
proposition that action otherwise constituting an event of force majeu
approvals and building
party (such as Teton Count y's action in denying the requested zoning
and therefore each of
permit) might constitute a risk assumed by the other contracting party,
Teton Count y's cited authorities is readily distinguishable.

4

Nor does it even remotely make

rt of its argument
The readily distinguishable authorities cited by Teton County in suppo
als and permits
approv
d
require
that, because Burns assumed Teton County would approve the
to exceed the height
that were requested, "Bum s assumed the risk of obtaining a permit
760 N.E.2d 453, 455-56
regulation" are as follows: Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Servs., Inc.,
with respect to its inability
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (relating to a party' s defense of force majeure
resale to the other party);
to purchase a commodity at a favorable price from a third person for
4
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do after Bums
sense that Bums would voluntarily assume the risk of what Teton County might
cting the public
incurred several hundred thousand dollars in out-of-pocket costs in constru
to immediately
improvements and other work it was contractually obligated to Teton County
construct.
Island
Nevertheless, relying solely on the opinion of the federal district court for Rhode
Education,
in URI Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Board of Governors for Higher
be held to have
915 F. Supp. 1267 (D.R.I. 1996), Teton County argues that Bums should
approvals and
assumed the risk that Teton County would deny Burns the required zoning
building permit it had requested because these denials were "foreseeable."
opinion on
The district court's opinion in URI Cogeneration Partners and the New York
, 519 N E 2d 295
which it is purpm tedly based, Kel Kim Corporation v. Central l,!arkets, lnc
Brief Also discussed
(N. Y. 1987), are distinguished and discussed, respectively, in Appellants'
appellate court
in Appellants' Brief in conjunction with analyzing these two opinions is the
23 (Ind. Ct. App.
opinion in Specialty Foods of Indiana, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 997 N.E.2d
2013), which held as follows:
(3d Cir. 1983)
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm 'n, 706 F.2d 444, 448-49
production of a
(relating to a party's defense of force majeure with respect to its insufficient
Dunaj v.
party);
commodity for sale to a third person for reasons not attributable to the other
defense of force
Glassmeyer, 580 N.E.2d 98, 100-01 (Ohio C.P. 1990) (relating to a party's
for reasons not
ds
majeure with respect to the inability to meet its performance standar
F.2d 43, 44 (3d
attributable to the other party); Buono Sales, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 363
inuance of a
Cir. 1996) (relating to a party's defense of force majeure with respect to its discont
v. United States,
product line for reasons not attributable to the other party); Austin Co.
expenses incurred
314 F.2d 518, 519 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (relating to a plainti ffs claim to recover its
was solely due to
under a contract that was terminated, where the "plaint iffs failure to perform
set forth in the
the fact that it was impossible for it to manufacture a workable system as
ties hold,
authori
these
of
specifications, which were the plainti ffs own design."). Again, none
event of force
not even suggest, that a contracting party's action otherwise constituting an
party.
ting
majeure might constitute a risk assumed by the other contrac
-1421813.001\4823-8! !8-5839 v2

The parties agree that the specific language from the force majeure
provision in the UMO Agreement with which we are concerned is
the phrase "any other reason not within the reasonable control of
Century Center."
Specialty Foods argues that the force majeure provision of
the UMO Agreement is inapplicable to excuse the Century
Center's performance because the termination of the Management
and License Agreements was "not unforeseeable." However, the
force majeure provision in this case contains nothing about
foreseeability, and Specialty Foods points to neither terms in the
provision nor in the remainder of the parties' contract in support of
its argument. The scope and effect of a force ma1eure clause
depends on the specific contract language.
Further, there is no evidence before us that the bargaining
between the parties was not free and open. The City, the Century
Center, and Specialty Foods are sophisticated parties presumably
represented by counsel who were at liberty to define the nature of
force majeure in whatever manner they desired. We decline to
re¥.rrite the parties' contract by interjecting into the force maj eure
provision a requirement of foreseeability.
5

Specialty Foods, 997 N.E.2d at 27 (internal and concluding citations omitted). And as is
pointed out in Appellan ts' Brief multiple other courts have also rejected the "foreseeable"
limitation imposed on force majeure clauses in URI Cogeneration Partners for the reasons
articulated in Specialty Foods. See, e.g., Perlman v. Pioneer Ltd. P'ship, 918 F.2d 1244, 1248
(5th Cir. 1990); Vinegar Hill Zinc Co. v. United States, 276 F.2d 13, 15-16 (Ct. CL 1960).
Finally, Teton County attempts to distinguish the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in

Idaho Power Company v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P.3d 1204 (2000), which Bums

Teton County attempts to distinguish the foregoing holding by arguing: "the loss of the
Hall of Fame completely obviated the need for a food and beverage vendor for the Hall of Fame.
That there be a Hall of Fame in South Bend was a basic assumption of their agreement."
Respondent's Brief 13-14. However, this argued "distinction" fails for the obvious reason that
Burns' construction of the Permanent Facility was also a basic assumption of the Agreement.
5
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County arguing:
also relied upon and extensively discussed in Appell ants' Brief, with Teton
revocation or
"The force majeure clause in Idaho Power specifically contemplates the
of the force
suspension of government permits." Respondent's Brief 14. Yet the relevant portion
majeure clause in Idaho Power merely provided as follows:
[F]orce majeure or an event of force majeure means any cause
beyond the control of the Seller or of Idaho Power which, despite
the exercise of due diligence, such Party is unable to prevent or
overcome, including but not limited to an act of God, fire, flood,
explosion, strike, sabotage, an act of the public enemy, civil or
military authority, court orders, laws or regulations, insurrection
or riot, an act of the elements or lack of precipitation resulting in
reduced water flows for power production purposes.
134 Idaho at 747-48, 9 P.3d at 1213-14 (bolding in original).

Thus, notwithstanding Teton

provision to "the
County's assertion to the contrary, there is no reference at all in the foregoing
"civil or military
revocation or suspension of government permits," but only a vague reference to
authority."
tion of
Moreover, similar indiscrete references were held not sufficient to trigger applica
6
al authority relied
the force majeure clause in URI Cogeneration Partners, which is the princip

Partners
The relevant portion of the force majeure clause at issue in URI Cogeneration
is as follows:
As used in this Agreement, "Force Majeure" means causes beyond the
g
reasonable control of and without the fault or negligence of the party claimin
Force Majeure. If either Party shall be unable to carry out any of its obligations
t
under this Agreement due to events beyond the reasonable control of and withou
not
the fault or negligence of the party claiming Force Majeu re-incl uding, but
limited to an act of God; sabotage; accidents; appropriation or diversion of steam
energy, equipment, materials or commodities by rule or order of any
in
governmental or judicial authority having jurisdiction thereof; any changes
ction;
insurre
e;
applicable laws or regulations affecting performance; war; blockag
riot; labor dispute; labor or material shortage; fuel storage; fire; explosion; flood;
nuclear emergency; epidemic; landslide; lightning; earthquake or similar
6
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district court for Rhode
upon by Teton County. And for this reason the opinion of the federal
the opinion of the Idaho
Island in Teton County's principal authority is irreconcilable with
Supreme Court in Idaho Power.
should be held to
Accordingiy, application of the Agreement's Force l'vfajeure Clause
have suspended Burns' obligation to construct the Permanent Facility.
B.

tion to
The Doctrine of Prevention Suspends or Discharges Burns' Obliga
Construct the Permanent Facility.

re Clause, Bums'
Just as with its position concerning the application of the Force Majeu
is not that Teton County
position with respect to the application of the doctrine of prevention
building permit required
breached the Agreement when it denied Burns the zoning approvals and
for construction of the Permanent Facility.

Burns' position, rather, is that in denying the

"outside the reasonable
requested zoning approvals and building permit, Teton County acted
n v. Bullock, 124 Idaho
contemplation of the parties when the contract was executed." Sulliva

ted the jury's verdict
738, 743, 864 P.2d 184, 189 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding the evidence suppor
she acted in a manner
that "when Mrs. Sullivan denied [Bullock] any further access to the home
when they executed the
that was outside the contemplation of the contract or the parties
CV 10-545-S-WBS, 2012
contract."). Accor d Peck Ormsby Constr. Co. v. City of Rigby, No.
of material fact precluding
WL 5273087, at *4 (D. Idaho Oct. 22, 2012) (finding a genuine issue
'outside the reasonable
summary judgment "[s]ince it is not clear that rejection ... was
Sullivan)).
contemplation of the parties when the contract was executed"' (quoting

the affected
catastrophic occur rence -this Agreement shall remain in effect, but
is unable
Party's obligations shall be suspended for the period the affected Party
to perform because of the disabling circumstances provided that: ....
915 F.Supp. at 1276.
-1721813.001 \4823-81 18-5839 v2

Teton County therefore misleadingiy frames Idaho law when it argues, without
explaining the judicial gloss applied to the terms it uses, that "in order for the doctrine of
prevention to apply, the actions of the party preventing performance must somehow be improper,
wrongful, or in excess of their iegal rights." Respondent's Brief 15. And for this reason, Teton
County's extensive justification of its actions under the Local Land Use Planning Act are wholly
beside the point.
Moreover, Teton County has completely failed to address the factual questions
determining the application of the prevention doctrine to the present dispute, as presented in
Appellan ts' Brief.

Or as there argued, the question with respect to whether the prevention

doctrine here applies under Idaho law is whether, at the time the Agreement was executed on
August 31, 2007, the par ties contemplated that Teton County would deny Burns the CUP and
building permit required to construct the Permanent Facility and then, two years later, would first
contest the validity of the applicable ordinance in order to avoid issuing Burns the zoning
approvals Bums required.
And as also argued by Bums in Appellants' Brief, because Paragraphs 2.b(iv)-(v) of the
Agreement require Bums to immediately commence construction of the Permanent Facility and
to erect and operate the Temporary Facility, rather than delaying or conditioning Bums'
performance until after Teton County approved the CUP application that was then pending
before it, there can be no genuine question but that the parties contemplated Teton County would
promptly issue Burns the CUP and building permit required to construct the Permanent Facility
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when they executed the Agreement.

7

Indeed, construction of the Permanent Facility without the

CUP and a building permit would have been both illegal and proscribed by the terms of the
Agreement.

8

Therefore, unless Teton County intended for Burns to immediately breach the

Agreement by either failing to commence construction of the Permanent Facility or by
commencing construction before obtaining the required CUP and building permit-s omething
Teton County has never asserted- Teton County must necessarily have "contemplated" it would
promptly approve and issue the CUP Burns required when Teton County executed the
Agreement on or about August 31, 2007.

9

Accordingly, application of the doctrine of prevention should be held to have suspended
or discharged Bums' obligation to construct the Permanent Facility based on the holding in
Sullivan v. Bullock and the reasons discussed in Appellan ts' Brief

C.

The Doctrine of Impossibility Suspends or Discharges Burns' Obligation to
Construct the Permanent Facility.

Burns argues in Appellants' Briefthat the doctrine of impossibility should be held to have
suspended or discharged Burns' obligation to construct the Permanent Facility based on the

If Paragraphs 2.b(iv)-(v) of the Agreement were not dispositive, there would then be a
genuine issue as to a material fact. See Sullivan, 124 Idaho at 743 n.2, 864 P.2d at 189.
However, Teton County has not submitted a scintilla of evidence supporting a finding that the
parties did not intend Burns to immediately commence construction of the Permanent Facility
following execution of the Agreement. Nor could any such evidence be considered without
violating the parol-evidence rule.
7

See Agreement 1 10 ("Developer agrees to comply with all federal, state, county and
local laws, rules and regulations, which pertain to the subject property.").
8

The City of Driggs' Planning and Zoning Commission heard on July 11, 2007 (or over a
month prior to the execution of the Agreement) and unanimously recommended for approval by
Teton County both the Agreement and the CUP requested by Burns. Complaint 115 [R, p. 5].
Teton County admits this fact in paragraph 15 of its Answer. [R, p. 27.]
9
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and the
opinion m Landis v. Hodgson, 109 Idaho 252, 706 P.2d 1363 (Ct. App. 1985),

ts (1981)
application of Sections 261, 264, and 266 of the Restatement (Second) of Contrac
of the legal
(hereinafter the "Restatement"). Teton County does not discuss, let alone rebut, any
s should
principles in the Restatement discussed in Appellants · Brief, which Burns contend
The
determine the question of whether the impossibility doctrine applies to the present dispute.
discussed
arguments Teton County does make with respect to the application of the doctrine are
below in the same sequence made in Respondent's Brief
Teton County first argues the ruling by the Idaho Suprem e Court that the CUP Burns
was void
sought could not be obtained because a provision in the relevant zoning ordinance

10

nts' Brief,
"was not a new law." Respondent's Brief 19. But as discussed and quoted in Appella
ility
and not rebutted by Teton County, the Restatement extends application of the impossib
was made
doctrine to "where a judicial decision is handed down after the time that the contract
giving an unantici pated interpretation to a statute enacted before that time."

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266, cmt. a.
was
Next Teton County argues that "because Burns was aware that zoning approval
as argued
necessary, the doctrine of impossibility is not applicable." Respondent's Brief 20. But
having
in Appellants' Brief, and also not rebutted by Teton County, the difference between Burns
, as
to obtain the CUP, as the parties expected when the Agreem ent was executed, or a variance
qualify, is
the Idaho Suprem e Court held to be required and for which the Property does not
at 416-417.
material for multiple reasons. See Burns Holdings I, 152 Idaho at 444-45, 272 P.3d

See Burns Holdings, LLC v. Teton Cnty. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 152 Idaho 440, 443-44, 272
P.3d 412, 415-16 (2012) (hereinafter "Burns Holdings I").
10
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all
fact, as a result of the change in the required approval Bums was deprived of any and
e to
ability it had to construct the 75' Permanent Facility, including through a judicial challeng
Teton County's denial of the CUP.
Teton County then argues that the impossibility doctrine "is aiso not applicable to the
plant
Development Agreement signed by the parties because Bums could have built a concrete
that complied with zoning restrictions."

Respond ent's Brief 20.

But this and the related

above
assertions Teton County makes with respect to what Bums could construct are contested
Teton
on the grounds that there is no support in the record or in fact for the assertions and that
County has misstated the terms of the Agreement. See supra Part II at ,r,r 7-9.
Teton County's penultimate argument is that "Appellants have made no showing that a
ent's
building height of 75 feet was a basic assumption on which the parties agreed." Respond
Brief 22.

But this assertion is also contested above on the grounds that Teton County has

to the
misstated the purpose of the Agreement as set forth in the second and third recitals
plant
Agreement, which establish that Bums' purpose was to "develop[] a concrete batch
facility ... " and that Teton County's purpose was to "allow[], by agreement, a specific
supra
development to proceed in a specific area and for a specific purpose or use .... " See

which
Part II at ,I 10. See also Paragraph 2.b(iii) and Exhibits "B" and "C" of the Agreement,
specify the site plan and building elevations for the Permanent Facility, and Paragraph 2.b(iv),
nt
which requires Bums to immediately "order and commence construction of the Permane
Facility."
Finally Teton County argues: "The height was not a basic assumption upon which both
parties made the contract. The law does not allow either the County or the applicant to assume
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. Yet
the land use application would be granted." Respond ent's Brief 23 (emphasis in original)
And
Teton County fails to cite any authority establishing what the law does or does not allow.
of the
even more to the point, the issue relating to the impossibility doctrine arises out
could
determination by the Idaho Supreme Court in Burns Holdings I that the CUP Bums sought
ed the
not be obtained because a variance was instead require d-whic h ruling establish
to Teton
impossibility of Bums constructing the Permane nt Facility -and does not relate
County' s denial of Bums' CUP application.
Accordingly, application of the doctrine of impossibility should be held to have
on the
suspended or discharged Bums' obligation to construct the Permane nt Facility based
266 of
holding in Landis v. Hodgson and the legal principles set forth in Sections 261, 264, and
the Restatement discussed in Appellants 'B, ief

D.

The Doctrine of Quasi-Estoppel Should Apply and Estop Teton County from
Rezoning Burns' Property.

Teton County does not dispute Bums' statement of controlling law for its defense that
contention
Teton County should be estopped from rezoning Bums' property, including Bums'
that the elements of quasi-estoppel under Idaho law are as follows:
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when: (1) the offending
party took a different position than his or her original position, and
(2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to
change positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the
offendin g party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he or
she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in.
169, 176
Terrazas v. Blaine Cnty. ex. rel. Bd. ofComm 'rs, 147 Idaho 193,200 n.3, 207 P.3d
(2009).

-222!813.001\4823-8118-5839 v2

Teton County instead disputes Bums' contention that not only is the first element of
ve
quasi-estoppel satisfied in this controversy, but so is each and every one of the alternati
grounds contained in the second element.
Thus, Teton County argues with respect to element #1 that "the only position that the
use
Board took on the height of the structure occurred at a public hearing where a conditional
ent's
permit was denied ... and at a public hearing where a variance was denied .... " Respond

into the
Brief23 . Yet as Bums notes above, Teton County admits in its Answer that it entered
Clerk,
Agreement and caused the Agreement to be recorded in the office of the Teton County
high.
and Exhibit "C" of the Agreement expressly depicts the Permanent Facility as being 75'
See supra Part II at 1 11.

Teton County argues with respect to element #2.a (the first of the three alternatives under
a
the second element of quasi-estoppel) that Teton County didn't gain an advantage or cause
;
disadvantage to Bums because (i) "Bums improved its own property," Respondent's Brief24

"the
(ii) "Bums agreed to and benefitted from the improvements they made," id. at 25; and (iii)
Bums'
temporary facility, which utilizes both the highway and road, has continued operating to
benefit," id. at 26. But each of the foregoing assertions are contested by Bums on the grounds
in the
that Teton County has misstated the terms of the Agreement and that there is no support
record or in fact for the assertions. See supra Part II at 11 12-14.
Moreover, Teton County effectively concedes satisfaction of the second element of quasi#2.b
estoppel because Teton County makes no argument at all with respect to alternative element
to
(i.e., that Bums was induced by Teton County to change positions), nor with respect
to
alternative element #2.c (i.e., that it would be unconscionable to permit Teton County
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maintain an inconsistent position from the one by which it obtained the public road and highway
improvements Bums constructed and after Burns incurred several hundred thousand dollars in
out-of-pocket costs in constructing the public improvements and other work it was contractually
obligated to Teton County to immediateiy construct).
Teton County does argue, however, that "[t]he only indication of exigent circumstances
given by Burns is their assertion that they have expended a large sum of money." Respondent's
Brief 25. But with respect to these expenditures Bums asks: If being induced into constructing
public road and highway improvements for the benefit of one contracting party through the grant
of contractual rights to the constructing party does not constitute "exigent circumstances," what
on earth does? Cf Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 201, 207 P.3d at 177 (where the Supreme Court found
the absence of "exigent circumstances" because "Applicants have not asserted that actions of the
Board induced them to change positions.").
Accordingly, Teton County should be held to be estopped from rezoning Burns' property
based on the opinion in Terrazas v. Blaine County and the reasons discussed in Appellants' Brief
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above and in Appellan ts' Brief, Bums contends that there is no
basis in the record or the law supporting the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Teton
County. Bums therefore respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's judgment in
favor of Teton County, including the award of attorney fees, and to remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion.
Finally, because the ultimate disposition of the dispute between Burns and Teton County
may be materially different if any of the four defenses asserted by Bums is held to be
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inapplicable, and with the hope of heading off yet another appeal that might otherwise result,
Bums respectfully requests this Court to rule in its opinion on the applicability of each the Force
Majeure Clause, the doctrine of prevention, the doctrine of impossibility, and the doctrine of
quasi-estoppei.
DATED this 19th day of April 2016.
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

/
By~~~
Brook B. Bond
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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